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The Significance of the European Investment Bank
Maria L. Pisaneschi
ABSTRACT
Since the implementation of the Treaty of Rome in 1958, the Common
Market of six European states has grown to the European Union of twentyfive states as of May 2004. From the outset, the integration of these states
into a single economic system has made more apparent the differences in
levels of economic development among and within the member states. The
original members of the Common Market were aware of these regional
differences in 1958 and created the European Investment Bank as part of the
Treaty of Rome to provide investment funds to reduce the development gap
among the member states.
This thesis assesses the extent to which the European Investment
Bank has contributed to closing this gap. An analysis of its lending to the
fifteen member countries of the European Union between 1995 and 2001
establishes that the economic development gap has not been reduced and
that the lending policies of the EIB have not significantly contributed to
solving differences in levels of development among these member states.
Examining the GDP of the member nations during this time period reveals
that the EIB has been unable to spur economic growth and close the
development gap. Particular attention is paid to those member states who
received the greatest percentage of EIB lending.
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Chapter One
The European Investment Bank

Introduction
What is the significance of the European Investment Bank as a
developmental tool for the European Union? What impacts have its activities
had on the development gap among and within the European Union member
states? Research on the EIB and its lending practices can demonstrate the
effectiveness or significance of the EIB in the development of the EU
economic community.
Frederick S. Dunn defines international relations as the actual relations
that take place across national boundaries or as the body of knowledge that
we have of those relations at any given time (Dougherty and Pflazgraff
1990). The integration of the European states, beginning with the birth of
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, has led to the development
of many supranational (as well as intergovernmental) institutions, including
the European Investment Bank (EIB). The Treaty of Rome created the EIB in
1958 as a finance institution that will contribute towards the integration,
balanced development and economic and social cohesion of the member
nations (European Investment Bank 1999). The EIB is concerned with
promoting smooth and balanced development of the member states of the
European Community, now the European Union (European Investment Bank
1978).
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While considered part of the EU, the EIB remains autonomous from other
institutions of the Union. The design of the EIB has been for operational
autonomy within a general legal framework. It has the authority to decide on
lending operations within the EU, but outside the EU the EIB acts on
mandates from the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (Dinan 1998).
The role of the EIB is one factor to assess in understanding the relationship
between the international political economy and regional movements such as
the European Union. Assessing the lending behavior of the EIB will enhance
our understanding of how regional development occurs among autonomous
states that are creating a single economy.
The EU is a single market system of 15 European nation-states. There
are uneven levels of economic development within this single market and
across and within each of the 15 member states. The expansion of the
European Union, with the addition of 10 new members in May 2004, will
create an even larger regional development gap. It was evident from their
creation of the EIB in the 1958 Treaty of Rome, that the six members of the
Common Market were already concerned with the issue of uneven levels of
development among the original members. The issue of uneven regional
development among and within the member states continued to be an issue
with each enlargement of the Common Market and later the European Union.
Each of the six original members joined for political reasons; and each
subsequent enlargement was also supported for a number of political
reasons. Yet the consequences of these political decisions were apparent for
the regional development gap issue. From the outset and thereafter, each
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enlargement made the development gap among the members and within
some of the members a more pronounced problem with which the EIB had to
contend. France was a pivotal country in establishing the Common Market.
Charles de Gaulle, President of France during this time period, saw the entry
of France as a positive opportunity both to address development issues
within his own country as well as for the promotion of his foreign policy goal
to establish a united Europe under French leadership. The European
Community offered an opportunity to stabilize the politics of France,
modernize its economy (establish its agricultural system), and create a
framework in which to embed Franco-German rapprochement (Dinan 1999).
French solidified its relationship with Germany when De Gaulle supported the
French policy of reconciliation and rapprochement. De Gaulle’s commitment
to the Treaty of Rome was given in exchange for German support for the
CAP. De Gaulle’s support was essential for establishing the European
Community. His commitment to the original common market was so firm
that he devalued the franc in 1958, cut government expenditures and
instituted tax hikes to bolster the French economy to prepare it for the
impending intra-EC tariff reductions. De Gaulle also saw the EC as a means
to improve the French economy. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
provided a large market for French agriculture and high prices even when the
world market prices were lower. This would give France time to modernize
its agricultural sector and close the agricultural development gap between
France and other original members (e.g., German Federal Republic and the
Netherlands).
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For several reasons, Britain was not willing to consider signing the
Treaty of Rome. Instead, it successfully proposed the establishment of the
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) to establish an alternative within
Europe to the Common Market. EFTA allowed Britain to maintain its
commonwealth relationships while also enjoying the benefits of special trade
preferences with other EFTA member states.

Of course, this alternative was

not welcomed by De Gaulle, who subsequently blocked Britain from entry
into the Common Market when it did apply several times after 1958. EC
member nations perceived Britain as deterrent from integration. Britain
applied for EC membership in 1967 and again de Gaulle led the opposition to
the application. Once again Britain was denied membership into the EC for
essentially the same reason as before.
The first enlargement of the Common Market began with British entry
negotiations in 1970. Pompidou, who had replaced DeGaulle, was far more
willing to consider British entry, especially since the French economy had
declined relative to that of the German Federal Republic between 1958 and
1970. Under Pompidou, France was also more supportive of British entry
because its membership was perceived as a means to ensure a gradual move
into the European Monetary Union (EMU) that France was so intent on
establishing. In fact, Pompidou’s willingness to support British entry went so
far that he actively supported the creation of the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) which Prime Minister Heath wanted as a promise
from the other Common market members to assist in closing the agricultural
and industrial development gaps between Britain and other Common Market
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member (Dinan 1999). Germany wanted to quicken the pace of EMU and
viewed enlargement as a deterring from this process. Britain viewed entry to
the EU as a means to become a more prosperous nation and obtain greater
economic development. While its entry into the Common Market would widen
the regional development gap among the member states, this issue was not
of central concern when terms of entry were negotiated.
The fishing and agricultural policy of the EU was of major concern to
Norway and essentially was the stumbling block to entry. The Norwegians
were concerned with EU agricultural and fishing policy as well as their
fledgling oil industry. Denmark, like many in Britain, was leery of
integration. Since Denmark conducted a majority of its trade with Britain, it
was compelled to apply for entry. Denmark needed access to Britain’s
markets and would not have those on equal terms with other common
market members if it chooses not to apply for entry. Ireland’s economy was
tied to Britain more than Denmark thus there was overwhelming support for
Irish entry into the Common Market. Although Ireland’s economy was linked
to that of Britain, it was severely underdevelopment. Joining the Common
Market would only exacerbate the gap in regional development among the
member states. The first enlargement consisted of these four countries
applying for entry, yet only three became members in January 1973. It
occurred just as the industrialized world, including Europe, began a period of
economic decline characterized by slow growth and rising inflation (i.e.,
stagflation). This only worsened regional development problems within the
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Common Market. Norway’s national referendum did not pass, thus they did
not choose to join.
The second enlargement occurred when Greece joined in 1981.
Greece had recently returned to a system of democracy. The addition of
Greece was seen as a means of combating the institutional decline of the EU.
Yet the gap in development between Greece and the other members of the
Common Market clearly made the regional development problem among the
member states a far more difficult issue to reason. The European Community
commission president wanted the enlargement to spur the existing EC
members to begin institutional reforms. This enlargement resulted in the
entrance of Greece only.
The third enlargement began with entrance negotiations of Spain and
Portugal.

This enlargement had tremendous economic obstacles to address

as these countries, like Greece, were extremely poor and also large
populations. The EC commission facilitated Portugal entry by providing funds
to modernize the economy. France was concerned with agricultural
competition with accession of Spain and this concern provoked a CAP reform.
Additionally Greece demanded the EC finalize Integrated Mediterranean
Programs (IMPs) before concluding enlargement negotiations. The IMPs
were financial assistance to not only Greece, but Italy and southern France
as well. This assistance was to promote agriculture, small business and
tourism. The end result was the member states agreeing to finance the IMPs
and allocating approximately 30 percent to Greece. This agreement removed
the final obstacle to Spain and Portugal entrance, both of whom joined in

6

1986. Clearly the arrangements for their entry pointed out how widespread
the regional development problem had become within the community.
The fourth enlargement occurred after the Maastricht Treaty was
implemented in November 1993 and renamed the EC the European Union.
Austria, Finland and Sweden joined in January 1995. This enlargement was
seen as strengthening the concepts of democracy and openness. This
enlargement extended the Union to the north and increased
its size by 33 percent. These countries brought new and different
perspectives on environmental issues, regional development and investment.
The accession of these nations occurred very rapidly as their respective
economies were stronger than most of the existing EU. Most importantly
they had already adopted much of EU policy. The EU wanted to fully
implement the single market program before another enlargement occurred.
The European Economic Area was created as an association of the twelve EU
countries and the seven European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members.
EFTA included Sweden, Austria and Finland. The EEA would become the
largest commercial bloc.

The EEA became a stepping stone to membership

in the EU.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its relations with several
Eastern European countries in the early 1990s, several former and newly
formed countries have sought admission to the European Union. In May
2004, ten of these countries will be admitted. Their admission to the EU has
been based on several reasons; but the primary concern has been political.
Allowing entry has been perceived as a mechanism for ensuring their
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progress toward democratic practices and the promotion of a market-based
approach to economic develop. At the same time, and as was already
experienced by the EU with the reunification of Germany in the mid-1990s,
their entry will intensify the need to solve problems related to disparities in
level of economic development among the twenty-five member states.
Against this brief background, there has been very little research
conducted on the effectiveness of the EIB in addressing the development gap
goals of the Common Market, then the European Community, and now the
European Union. The EIB was created in 1958 to deal with regional
development issues among the six member states. Although its mission since
then has not changed, this brief description of enlargement clearly
establishes that the politics of enlargement has impacted the extent to which
the scope of the problem for which the EIB was created has become far more
extensive and complex since 1958. This thesis will contribute to
understanding the effect EIB has had on regional development goals and why
this effect has occurred.
The relationship among the EU, regional development and the EIB has not
been fully analyzed in any scholarly writings. Literature does exist which
separately discusses these entities, their goals and structures. This literature
will be utilized as the starting point for a more in depth analysis of the
regional development gap within the EU.
When discussing the EIB, most literature addresses the area of regional
development. The development of transport, telecommunications and
energy infrastructure has a great impact on the economic growth rates in the
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different regions of the EU (Balchin and Sykora 1999). Rates of economic
growth are a primary concern of the EIB, especially in the area of regional
development. The EIB (1999) requires all projects brought to it for lending
adhere to one of the following objectives:


Foster economic development in less favored regions (balanced
development)



Improve European transport and telecommunications infrastructure



Protect the environment



Secure energy resources



Boost the competitiveness of industry



Promote small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)



Modernize and extend the infrastructure in the health and education
sectors

These objectives of the EIB provide insight into the lending practices and
procedures of the bank. What is relevant to the research question is how
these EIB objectives, particularly economic development have been effective
in reducing the regional development gap and promoting integration within
the Union.
I propose that the European Union member states have not been
successful in closing the differences in levels of development among
themselves. I will test this proposition by completing a case study of the
European Investment Bank.
The remainder of chapter one will contain a review of current literature
regarding the European Investment Bank relevant to the thesis. The
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relevant theory of international relations will be briefly identified and the
sources and method of research that will be utilized in this thesis are named.
In chapter two I will describe the organization and foundation of the EIB. I
will review the treaties and the applicability to the research proposal.
Chapter three will outline the establishment of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and its connection to the research proposal.
I will review the lending patterns of the EIB in chapter four. Chapter four is a
detailed analysis of the financing of EIB lending in relation to the individual
countries of the European Union. Finally, in chapter five, I will summarize
and provide analysis of the case study of the European Investment Bank
created by earlier chapters. Chapter five serves as a conclusion to the
research project and reports the results from testing the research
proposition.

Literature Review
There are three areas of research that are present in the literature
review that analyze the European Investment Bank. These areas are EU
institutional effects, non-EU institutional effects and effects since the 1980’s.
European Union Institutional Effects
The regional development role of the EIB may also be affected by the
different kinds of relations it has with various EU institutions. Laffan (1997)
argues the relationship between the EIB and the Commission of the EU is
complementary and does not suffer from the interinstitutional rivalry, which
is prevalent in most of the decision making in the EU. Laffan supports this
complementary relationship by noting that two senior directors from the
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commission serve on the board of directors for the EIB. However, the
Commission has created initiatives to address regional development that are
separate from the EIB. For instance, the EU established the Cohesion Fund,
a programming approach for structural spending within the EU. The Treaty
on European Union (TEU) created the Cohesion Fund for the four poorest
countries of the union.

It was created as a separate entity, independent

from another EU program: the European Regional Development Fund (ERFD)
established in the 1970s in response to demands from the United Kingdom.
What is the relationship between these programs and the EIB? The Cohesion
Fund and the ERFD must be assessed to determine their contributions, as
compared to those of the EIB, to closing the regional development gap. Are
these programs compatible with those of the EIB, thereby reflecting a
harmonious relationship between the EU commission and the EIB on the
question of regional development?
Laffan (1997) claims there is an uneasy relationship between the EIB
and two other EU institutions: the European Parliament and European Court
of Auditors. The relatively complementary relationship between the EIB and
the Commission does not exist between the EIB and the European Parliament
(EP). The EP is continually presenting resolutions to ensure adequate
political monitoring of the borrowing and lending activities of the EU,
including the EIB (Laffan 1997). The EP argues that the EIB should be held
to greater accountability because the EIB manages funds on behalf of the
community. The EP also argues that the EIB’s lending activities affect the
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implementation of structural funds from a budgetary perspective and
therefore should be monitored (Laffan 1996).
Along with the EP, the Court of Auditors has had a continued dispute with
the EIB regarding the process of auditing. The EIB maintains its own
auditing structure and does not want the Court to conduct audits. In
November 1992, an agreement was signed between the two institutions to
normalize relations between the institutions and set up a framework for
auditing. To what extent are the positions of the EP and the Court of Auditors
factors that effect EIB’s regional development goals?
Laffan’s analysis suggests that the level of cooperation between the EIB
and EU institutions varies; but he does not assess how this variation affects
EIB regional development goals. Do the Commission’s economic goals
promote greater integration and closure of the regional development gap?
How do the positions of the EP and the Court of Auditors influence EIB
operations? These questions illuminate another avenue of research in this
subject area.
Effects of Non-European Union Institutions
Guntar Handl focuses on sustained development in his analysis. His focus
is on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). His analysis does not
specifically discuss the EIB; however it does mention the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
The EBRD began operating in April 1991 and is not an institution of the
EU, but the member states had a key role in its development. It is the 4th
largest major area-based development bank (Jones 1996). It is part
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development bank and part investment bank. Its starting capital came from
EU and non-EU states as well as several non-European states. ERBD
members include the EIB and the European Commission, which have both
contributed to its capital base. Much criticism has ensued since its inception
as it appears to duplicate the role of the World Bank and the EIB.
Handl calls for a mandate to ensure that MDBs funding for development
contribute to the economic growth, social development and environmental
protection in the context of sustainable development (Handl 1998).
Sustained development has become one of (in Handl’s opinion) crucial
elements in MDBs. He praises the EBRD for its agreement that directs the
Bank to “promote in the full range of its activities environmentally sound and
sustainable development (Handl 1998)”. Although not necessarily concerned
with the regional development gap, but rather sustainable development, this
analysis brings forth the concept of MDBs becoming politically involved in a
nation’s development. How does the concept of sustainable development
and political involvement within nations affect EIB efforts to address regional
development?
The Effect of Developments since the 1980s on EIB Regional
Development Activities
An examination of the expanded roles of the EIB will be researched to
determine the effectiveness of the EIB’s ability to address the regional
development gap in the face of its expanding role. Dinan (1999) provides a
straightforward description of the EIB and its structure but also identifies four
developments within the EU during the 1980’s and 1990’s that increased the
role of the EIB in addressing EU issues:
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Single market program increased demand for loans to improve EU
infrastructure to increase industrial competitiveness.



Single European Act lead to an emphasis on projects in the area of
regional development



German unification resulted in increased demand for EIB financing for
environmental programs



The need for assistance in Central and Eastern Europe has led to the
EIB including these areas in their financing programs

The Single European Act of 1986 did not alter the structure of the bank,
but the Act is instrumental in understanding the theme of unification.
However, this role is not discussed in detail in Coombes and Rees analysis.
The analysis of Coombes and Rees, Balchin and Sykora and regional
development policy in the EU provides the groundwork for determining the
economic goals of the EU particularly in the area of regional development.
Coombes and Rees argue that the increased activity in the Community’s
regional and social policies during 1989 and 1990 reflect the new emphasis
on economic and social cohesion. This activity includes (Coombes and Rees
1991):
1. Many decisions were approved by the community to reform and
expand structural funds with important new procedures involving
long-term support frameworks for individual states, regional
development programs from different community funding sources
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and intensified consultation and control by the commission in this
area.
2. A Social Charter was adopted to define basic rights for people
throughout the community.
The increased role of the EIB, as indicated, has resulted in an increased
lending base for the bank. These developments touch briefly on the ongoing
relationship between the EIB and the EU, and regional development. Further
study of these developments will indicate how the lending policies of the EIB
have affected the EU in reaching regional development goals and whether the
EIB has been effective in promoting integration within the European Union
through its lending practices.
The Amsterdam Treaty signed in the latter part of the 1990s has also
affected the role of the EIB. That treaty gave authority to the EIB to lend
money for health and education projects as well as provide risk capital for
small and medium sized enterprises (Osborn 1999). However, these new
roles were not intended to replace the primary focus of the bank on balanced
regional development. Osborn (1999) argues the new roles established in
the Amsterdam Treaty were created as a result of the EU’s inability to
generate a plan for job creation without weakening the fiscal controls
required to meet the deadlines for The European Monetary Union (EMU) in
1999. In addition, Osborn (1999) argues the EIB will be instrumental in
easing the conversion to the single currency, the Euro. Osborn’s
observations also reveal the relationship that exists between the EIB and the
EU. The addition of other nations to the EU is dependent on the ability of the
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EIB to address the economic disparities of candidate nations. The EU will not
allow admission of a member nation that could be a categorized as a
“burden” to the economic system of the Union. The utilization of the EIB by
the EU may indicate one approach (in terms of regional development) of
these organizations; however, further research will be required to determine
applicability to the research question.
Zysman and Schwartz examine European unification in light of a changed
world economy, specifically focusing on the industrial integration of Central
and Eastern Europe into the broader European economy. They argue that for
two generations the EU has sought to create a single market from the
economies of a set of similar political economies, a homogeneous economic
space established by a policy-driven convergence of market rules (Zysman
and Schwartz 1998). The basis of their analysis is a comparison to the tiers
of economic development in Asia and a focus on international production
networks. This analysis calls for a reorganization of production to promote
integration, a redivision of labor (Zysman and Schwartz 1998).
Although their focus is on Asia and production, several points are
revealed that are important to gaps in regional development and the EU
member states: (Zysman and Schwartz 1998)
•

The range of incomes, wages and skills in Europe was very
compressed or specialized by region prior to integration.

•

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War, the range of wage and technological capacities has been
dramatically extended in regions of Europe.
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•

The goal of the EU is to create a homogeneous economic
environment.

•

Europe has become a much more economically heterogeneous
region, thus creating a larger development gap.

Zysman and Schwartz argue Multinational Corporations (MNCs) will be
more involved in Central and Eastern European development. The EIB has
been shown to be involved in capital investments in these areas of Europe.
The emergence of MNCs will affect EIB lending policies.
Zysman and Schwartz find that the increased development in the areas of
transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures will greatly impact
the rates of regional economic growth. A regional development gap resulted
in Central and Eastern Europe and it was not until the early 1990’s that this
imbalance was addressed.

They argue the trans-European networks (TENs)

were created after the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, in an effort to facilitate
multi-mode connections with the peripheral regions and to assist in the
development of a single market (Zysman and Schwartz 1998). Development
of transport, telecommunications and energy TENs are imperative, according
to Zysman and Schwartz, for the development of a Single European Market.
They were unable to judge whether TENs have been effective in reducing the
regional development gap.

Relevant Theories
Neofunctionalism grew out of the theory of functionalism in the 1950’s.
It was developed to explain integration on a regional scale (Jones 1996).
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Functionalism was based on the view that regionalism could be built from the
ground up by focusing on particular economic problems and solutions to
those problems. By contrast, neofunctionalism emphasizes the political
processes that lead to regional integration through the attainment of
economic goals (Wood and Yelilada 1996). The EIB is a political institution,
comprised of elites from various European nations. It interacts with various
EU institutions. The relationship among these elites, the EU institutions, and
the EIB is important in determining the effectiveness of the EIB in influencing
the regional development gap. Therefore, I expect that the results of a case
study on the EIB will best be explained by neofunctionalist theory of
integration.

Sources and Methods of Research
I will review the lending of the EIB from its beginning to 2001 and the
ERDF from 1991 to 2001. Review of the ERDF will be used to support of the
existence of a regional development gap. These are the two organizations
within the European Union active in addressing the development gap among
EU member states. I will then offer a detailed analysis of EIB lending from
1995 to 2001 concerning what each EU member state was lent and for what
projects.
The data required for this research are readily available from the EIB
including annual reports, annual brochures, EIB economic research papers
compiled by EIB staff, external scholars and specialists, technical reports on
loan projects, and other miscellaneous publications. The other institutions of
the European Union also have data readily available, including annual
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reports, budget reports and treaty information. In addition, scholarly
journals, including (but not limited to) The Journal of Common Market
Studies, International Organization, European Economic Review, The
American Journal of International Law and Regional Studies will be a valuable
resource of pertinent information. I will also provide evidence about changes
in the development gap across member states (and within member states
where appropriate).
The primary sources (treaties, annual reports, etc) will be analyzed to
establish trends in the lending practices of the EIB and the regional
development gap. Secondary resources will be utilized as supporting
evidence of patterns observed in the primary sources. The end result will be
a predominately qualitative research piece; however, budget analysis will
lead to some quantitative results. This will allow examination of what, if any,
relationship there may be between the EIB lending and changes in the
development gap among EU member states.
This is a case study based primarily on quantitative and qualitative
resources. The case study is a historical analysis that identifies changes that
have occurred in the treaty status of the EIB and the lending practices of the
EIB. The case study is presented in chapters two, three and four. Chapter
three regarding the EBRD illuminates several points that relate to the
proposition. The EBRD represents an effort of the European Union to address
the growing concern for the regional development gap occurring in Europe.
The EBRD is similar in structure to the EIB; however, its membership is not
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limited to the EU. It also includes non-members. A general overview of the
EBRD is added to the case study to reinforce the concept of a growing
regional development gap in Europe.
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Chapter Two
The Legal Organization of The European Investment Bank
Introduction
The European Investment Bank (EIB) originated with the Treaty of
Rome in 1957. The Treaty of Rome established the European Community
and was written by the following countries: Belgium, Germany (at this time
considered West Germany), France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
These countries would later be referred to as “member nations”. The EIB is
an autonomous financial institution established by articles 129 and 130 of the
Treaty of Rome (Dinan 323).
A historical perspective of the EIB may be achieved by examining
various European Union documents. Beginning with its inception with the
Treaty of Rome through the most current treaty, the Treaty of Nice, the
development of the bank can be traced. This development includes the legal
basis for the bank and its capital base.

The Treaty of Rome
The Treaty of Rome (Article 267) defines the task of the European

Investment Bank is to contribute to a balanced and steady development of
the common market in the interest of the entire European Community. The
EIB will provide financing for specific projects based on the following criteria:
1) A project for developing less developed regions.
2) A project for modernization or conversion to the establishment of
the common market and those projects, which would be too large
for a single member country to finance.
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3) Projects of common interest to several member nations which due
to size or nature are unable to be financed by means available in
individual member states.

The Treaty of Rome also dictates that members of the EIB would be
the member states themselves. The Statute of The European Investment
Bank is established by a Protocol annexed to this Treaty.

Protocol for Establishing the European Investment Bank
The Protocol for establishing the European Investment Bank is detailed
in Appendix A. This protocol establishes the banks mandate of regional
development.

The protocol is a detailed document outlining the authority

and responsibilities of the EIB. The most critical article of the protocol in
terms of this research is Article 2 that defines the task of the bank in Article
267 of the Treaty of Rome. This article essentially defines the mandate of
the European Investment Bank as promoting and contributing to a balanced
development of the common market in the interest of the entire European
Community.

An assessment of GDP will be used to assess if the EIB has

fulfilled this task as established in the Protocol. The Protocol develops
criteria for the lending procedures of the bank. One of the fundamental
criteria is lending for projects in less developed regions. This is directly
related to the research question. The attached Appendix A provides the
detailed tasks of the bank. The Protocol reveals the reasoning of the EU for
developing the EIB by presenting the criteria necessary for EIB funding. The
structure of the EIB as offered by the Protocol indicates the involvement of
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the EU. The Bank directors are selected by nominations from the member
nations. Thus concerns of the Bank would be EU related. Article 18 does
provide provisions for investment outside the EU but only when authorized
by the Board of Governors acting on proposals from the Board of Directors.
Article 20 specifically addresses the operating principles that require all loans
or grants to promote the goal of the common market. This denotes the
overall theme of the EIB.

The Protocol establishes the audit process for the

Bank, which is internal by a committee of three appointed by the Board of
Governors. This testifies to the autonomy of the EIB from outside
institutions. The Protocol serves as an in depth definition of the EIB that was
created by Article 267 of The Treaty of Rome.

Single European Act
This Act was signed in February 1986, but did not come into force until
July 1987. This act makes no special provisions or changes in regard to the
European Investment Bank. The main theme of the Act is cooperation. The
Act redefines the powers of the Commission in regards to the implementation
of progress towards European unity. A major focus of the Act is the
development of the internal market and a general movement toward a
European Union.
The Act also included items regarding political cooperation, common
policies and community interests. However, this Act does not alter the
structure of the European Investment but rather institutes a progression
towards a European Union.
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The Treaty on European Union
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed in February 1992 and
was primarily concerned with establishing the European Union founded on
the existing European Communities. Again, there are no specific references
to the EIB. TEU is primarily focused on the attainment of common foreign,
security policies and international cooperation.
The TEU redefines the roles of the European Council, the President, the
Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice in implementing the
concept of Union.

The adjustments to the established European

Communities include budget adjustments and common action among the
Member States in regards to police actions.
Articles 40 and 43 of the TEU are perhaps the only items that may be
related to the EIB, but not specifically stated. These articles allow Member
States the opportunity to make use of institutions, procedures and
mechanisms of The Treaties (starting with the Treaty of Rome to present) to
create closer cooperation with other Member States and furthering the
objectives of the Union. Although the EIB is not stated specifically in the
Articles, it may be inferred from the idea of institutions.

The Statute of the European Investment Bank
The 1999 version of the Statue is very similar to the Protocol that
establishes the Bank. The most notable change is in Article 4, which
increases the capital of the Bank to one hundred billion Euros and changes
the subscribed rates of the Member states to reflect this capital:
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Table 1:

New Subscribed Capital Rates Converted to Euro

Germany

17,766,355,000

France

17,766,355,000

Italy

17,766,355,000

United Kingdom

17,766,355,000

Spain

6,530,656,000

Belgium

4,924,710,000

Netherlands

4,924,710,000

Sweden

3,267,057,000

Denmark

2,493,522,000

Austria

2,444,649,000

Finland

1,404,544,000

Greece

1,335,817,000

Portugal

860,858,000

Ireland

623,380,000

Luxembourg

124,677,000

This Article also indicates the change from the ECU as the unit of
account to the Euro. Article 5 is amended to change the average amount of
the subscribed capital to be paid to 6 percent from 7.50162895 percent as
originally dictated by The Treaty of Rome. Article 13 is amended to increase
the number of Vice Presidents from six to seven on the Management
Committee.

The Treaty of Nice
These amendments to TEU were developed in October 2001 in Nice
and compiled into The Treaty of Nice and protocols. This treaty was ratified
by the EU in February 2003. These amendments are not concerned with the
EIB but rather developing consistency in Union policies.
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The Treaty of Nice is concerned primarily with voting rights and
enhancing cooperation among the Member States. A recurrent theme in this
treaty as well as previous treaties is a common foreign policy and common
security policy. The Treaty of Nice does replace Article 43 of the TEU, but it
essentially remains the same.
In conclusion, with the exception of a few minor changes with the
1999 Statute, the European Investment Bank has remained unchanged from
its inception with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The review of The Treaty of
Rome describes the Bank and its role in The European Union. Study of other
European Union documents since the Treaty of Rome illustrates the minor
changes the bank has undergone since 1957. The minor changes that have
occurred since 1957 do not alter the original task of the bank, which is
central to the research.
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Chapter 3
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Introduction
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was
established in 1991. At that time communism was failing in Central and
Eastern Europe. The EBRD was created to assist these countries in
developing market economies and democracies. The EBRD is committed to
the fundamental principles of multi-party democracy. The mandate of the
bank is to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and
to promote private and entrepreneurial initiatives in the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe (EBRD 1991). The principal office of the Bank is located
in London, England; however it may establish branch offices in any territory
of members of the Bank. The functions of the EBRD include fostering the
transition of Central and Eastern European countries toward open marketoriented economies and the promotion of private and entrepreneurial
initiatives, encourage the development of capital markets, give support to
economically viable projects involving more than one recipient member
country, promote activities that are environmentally sound and those
promoting sustainable development. Membership in the bank is open to
European countries, members of the European Economic Community (EEC),
members of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and those non-European
countries that are currently members of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Members can also be admitted by a three-fourths majority vote of no
less than two-thirds of the bank’s Board of Governors.
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The capital stock of the bank has been set at ten thousand million ECU
and is divided into one million shares with a value of ten thousand ECU each.
This authorized capital stock may increase or decrease by a two-thirds vote
of the Board of Governors. The Board must review the capital stock of the
bank at least once every five years to determine whether an increase or
decrease may be necessary. Payment of the paid in shares of bank members
shall be made in five installments of twenty percent of the subscription
amount, these installment payments are to begin no later than sixty days
after membership entry. Capital resources for bank operations include these
capital shares of members as well as funds raised by borrowing, repayment
of loans, investments and any other funds or income received by the bank.
The bank may charge commissions or fees in addition to interest received for
loans it has granted.
The methods of operation for achieving the functions or mandate of
the bank include (EBRD 1991):
1. Banks or interested sources, loans to state-owned enterprises
operating competitively and moving towards participation in the
market economy or loads to aide in the facilitation of these
enterprises into private control.
2. Investment in equity capital of private sector enterprises.
3. Investment in the equity capital of any state-owned enterprise
operating Making or co-financing with other multilateral
institutions, commercial competitively and moving to participation
in a market oriented economy.
4. Underwriting where financing is not appropriate.
5. Facilitation of access to domestic and international capital markets
for private enterprises.
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6. Providing loans for technical assistance for reconstruction or
development of infrastructure.
7. Deploying Special Funds and determining the use of these funds.
The structure of the bank consists of a Board of Governors, a Board of
Directors, a President, at least one Vice-President and any other officers
deemed necessary. Each member of the EBRD appoints one governor and
one alternate. The powers of the Board of Governors include (EBRD 1991):
1.

Admission of new members or determination of conditions of
entry.

2.

Increase or decrease capital stock of bank.

3.

Suspend a member, if necessary.

4.

Decide on appeals from interpretations or applications of the
agreement of the bank by the Board of Directors.

5.

Authorize the conclusion of general agreements.

6.

Elect the Directors and President of the Bank.

7.

Determine the salary and other terms of the contract of service
of the president and the remuneration of the Directors and
Alternate Directors.

8.

Approve the general balance sheet and the profit and loss
statements after reviewing the auditor’s report.

9.

Determine the reserves and the allocation and distribution of the
net profits of the bank.

10.

Amend the agreement establishing the ERBD.

11.

Decide to terminate the bank operations and liquidate the
assets.

12.

Exercise the powers of the Board of Governors as expressed in
the establishing agreement.

The Board of Governors holds an annual meeting or additional meetings if
required to fulfill the duties to conduct the business of the EBRD.
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The Board of Directors or members of the bank whose voting power is
greater than one quarter of the voting power of the bank can request a
meeting. All regulations and decisions must pass the Board of Directors by a
majority of no less then two-thirds of the voting power.
The Board of Directors is comprised of twenty-three (23) members
who are not members of the Board of Governors. Eleven (11) of the
directors are elected by the Governors representing Belgium, Denmark,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, the
European Economic Community and the European Investment Bank. Four
(4) are elected by Governors representing countries in Central and Eastern
Europe that are eligible for assistance from the EBRD. Four (4) are elected
by Governors representing other European countries and four (4) are elected
by Governors representing non-European countries. Thus, the Board of
Directors is elected by the Board of Governors. The powers of the Board of
Directors are minimal and include preparing the work for the Board of
Governors, establishing policies concerning loans, guarantees, investments,
borrowing of the Bank and technical assistance on the operations of the Bank
(EBRD 1991). The Board of Directors also approves the budget of the Bank
and submits the audited accounts of each financial year to the Board of
Governors (EBRD 1991). The Board of Directors functions as the principal
office of the bank and meets as necessary to conduct the business of the
bank. A majority of the Directors constitutes the quorum for any decisions of
the Board.
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The President of the EBRD is elected by the Board of Governors

for a

term of four (4) years and is eligible for re-election (EBRD 1991). The
President is the legal representative of the Bank and is responsible, as the
chief of staff, for the organization, appointment and dismissal of the officers
of the Bank.

In addition to these duties, the President also chairs the

meetings of the Board of Directors and under their direction conducts the
current business of the bank.
One or more Vice-Presidents are appointed by the Board of Directors
based on recommendations of the President of the Bank. The Vice-President
may participate in meetings of Board of Directors but has no voting
authority. In the event of the incapacity or absence of the President, the
Vice-President becomes the acting President of the Bank including voting
privileges within the Board of Directors.
The following table presents the initial capital subscription amounts
and shares allocated to member nations.
Table 2:

Initial Subscribed Capital of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development

European Communities

Number of
Shares

Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany, Federal Republic of
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom

22,800
12,000
85,175
85,175
6,500
3,000
85,175
2,000
24,00
4,200
34,00
85,175

31

Capital
Subscription in
million ECU
228.00
120.00
851.75
851.75
65.00
30.00
851.75
20.00
248.00
42.00
340.00
851.75

European Economic Community
European Investment Bank
Austria
Cyprus
Finland
Iceland
Israel
Liechtenstein
Malta
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
German Democratic Republic
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Yugoslavia
Australia
Canada
Egypt
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Mexico
Morocco
New Zealand
United States of America
Non allocated shares
Total

30,000
30,000
22,800
1,000
12,500
1,000
6,500
200
100
12,500
22,800
11,500
7,900
7,900
12,800
15,500
7,900
12,800
4,800
60,000
12,800
10,000
34,000
1,000
85,175
6,500
3,000
1,000
1,000
100,000
125
1,000,000

300.00
300.00
228.00
10.00
125.00
10.00
65.00
2.00
1.00
125.00
228.00
228.00
115.00
79.00
128.00
155.00
79.00
128.00
48.00
600.00
128.00
100.00
340.00
10.00
851.75
65.00
30.00
10.00
10.00
1,000.00
1.25
10,000.00

Similar to the European Investment Bank, these capital subscription amounts
were converted to the Euro in 1999. Unlike the EIB, however, the EBRD
does not focus primarily on the EU. The subscribed members of the EBRD
are worldwide, not just the European Union. The variety of members of the
EBRD indicates the focus of the EBRD is not centered in the European Union
as the EIB proclaims to do with its mandate.
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The creation of the EBRD demonstrates the EU’s concerns for a
development gap within the Europe; however its member base indicates a
concern for areas outside the European Union.

Therefore, the task of aiding

in regional development within the European Union falls on the EIB. The
EBRD just maintains a supporting role.

Regional Development
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development requires any
country seeking investment from the bank to be moving toward a full market
economy. This requirement coincides with the mandate for requiring
countries to be committed to democratic principles. The creation of the
Bank, although not limited to just European Union development, indicates
the push for a market economy in the European region. This effort is similar
to that of the European Investment Bank. The establishment of these two
banks indicates the regional development gap occurring in Europe and the
concern that Central and Eastern European nations will need to move
towards a free market economy in order to be competitive with the world
economic market today. A brief analysis of the member subscription in each
bank indicates the wider realm of the ERBD. Membership in the ERBD
includes the European Investment Bank, which indicates the overlapping
direction of the Banks. It could be perceived that the ERBD was created as a
supplement to the EIB to decrease the increasing regional development gap.
In addition, the inclusion of such nations as the United States indicates the
worldwide concern for this increasing gap with the fall of communism in the
east.
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Chapter Four Case
The Lending Patterns of The European Investment Bank
Introduction
An overview of financing provided by the EIB since it’s inception in
1959 through 1997 is indicated in Table 3. This general overview indicates
several points regarding EIB lending. The Table indicates the general
increase in financing throughout this time period. This trend indicates the
need for more lending as the European Union (or European Community,
depending on the time) was growing.

It also indicates the gaining capital

strength of the Bank since predominately most of the lending capital was
from EIB’s own resources. This Table also indicates financing that was
provided in areas outside the European Union. Although these data are not
specific to lending location, it is an indication of EIB interest in outside areas.
Unless this lending benefits a development within the Union, this type of
lending is in direct contrast to the tasks of the EIB as set forth in the Protocol
that calls for balanced development within the EU. Although this financing
only amounts to approximately nine percent of all financing within the period,
it is still noteworthy in terms of the research.
Table 3:

Financing Provided by the EIB from 1959-1997
ECU Million

Total
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

34
25
87
66
71

Within the European Union
Total
Own
NCI*
Resources Resources
34
34
25
25
87
87
66
66
56
56
-
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Outside the European Union
Total
Own
Budgetary
Resources Resources
15
15
-

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

120
109
197
213
214
322
354
503
524
848
1,119
1,007
1,273
1,573
2,179
3,071
3,478
3,839
4,695
5,946
6,903
7,118
7,556
7,849
10,180
12,246
13,339
15,393
17,032
19,625
19,930
21,408
23,239
26,203

112
88
104
148
173
248
339
469
504
728
973
918
1,086
1,403
1,957
2,558
2,930
3,352
4,243
5,466
6,194
6,458
7,071
7,450
9,480
11,634
12,626
14,477
16,140
17,724
17,682
18,603
20,946
22,958

112
88
104
148
173
248
339
469
504
728
973
918
1,086
1,403
1,957
2,281
2,733
2,821
3,453
4,266
5,013
5,574
6,678
7,003
9,123
11,556
12,602
14,438
16,140
17,724
17,682
18,603
20,946
22,958

239,893

217,513

211,112

-

277
198
531
790
1,200
1,182
884
393
447
357
78
24
39
-

8
21
93
64
42
74
16
33
21
120
146
89
187
170
222
513
548
487
452
480
708
660
485
398
700
612
713
916
893
1,905
2,248
2,805
2,293
3,244

8
16
31
20
12
16
2
23
13
11
61
49
142
152
174
421
371
396
410
427
621
584
382
189
520
486
669
782
764
1,807
1,979
2,557
2,190
3,190

6,399

22,379

19,490

5
62
44
29
58
14
11
8
109
85
40
45
18
48
92
176
90
41
53
88
75
103
210
180
126
44
134
128
96
269
248
104
55
2,889

*New Community Instrument
EIB Lending 1995-2001
The European Union created the European Investment Bank and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as a means of
addressing the foreseen developmental gap that has been created by the
induction of additional members to the European Union. These banks were
also created to assist the existing members in achieving a balanced economic
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community. A development gap clearly exists within the European Union; in
order for the EU to successfully accept additional members it becomes
necessary for this gap to be resolved. A prevailing theme throughout the
development of the EU and the EIB has been balanced development. More
detailed information regarding European Investment Bank financing is
provided in tables 4, 5 and 6 documenting loans received by EU member
countries for the period 1995-2001. This more detailed data provides further
proof of the ineffectiveness of the EIB in the area of regional development.
Several points become apparent when reviewing the data from the
tables. A foremost objective of the European Investment Bank is balanced
development; however upon examining the lending patterns indicated by the
table in the period of 1995 – 2001 the percentage of loans appropriated for
regional development peaks at 55 percent.

The loan emphasis during this

period does not appear to be dominated by regional development
investment. To obtain the desired balanced economic arena, the economic
development gap between the current member nations must be addressed
and solved. The members of the EU created the bank primarily for this
purpose; however the data compiled uncovers the shortcomings of the EIB in
this task. To further bolster this finding, more in depth data are required.
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Table 4:

Total EIB Loans to EU Members 1995-2001
ECU Millions*

EU
Member
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Austria
Netherlands
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United
Kingdom
Totals

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

665.3
824.9
2715
525.2
2,817.6
2,206.8
327.3
3,434.9
78.8
241.9
318.9
1,231.5
179.1
273.1
2,243.9

657
688
3,022
721
2,553
2,509
189
4,121
490
766
1,294
302
847
2,386

1,140
737
3,518
730
2,716
2,271
207
3,517
96
555
398
1,350
401
925
3,765

858
745
5,168
736
3,152
2,837
263
4,387
109
358
426
1,505
551
664
3,074

2260
898
5,534
1,436
4,048
4,295
87
4,053
105
311
606
1,603
576
544
3,348

503
991
6,038
1,712
4,199
3,323
419
5,640
200
260
735
1,852
525
621
3,303

365
1,172
6,017
1,658
4,559
3,825
525
5,488
10
787
820
1,799
695
953
2,337

18,084.2

20,545

22,326

24,833

29,704

30,321

31,010

*Years 2000 and 2001 are represented in Euro Millions pursuant to 1999
Statute of the EIB change.
Table 5:
Total EIB Regional Development Loans to EU Members
1995-2001
ECU Millions*
EU
Member

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Austria
Netherlands
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United
Kingdom
Totals

138.1
294.3
1,112.7
269.4
2,526.4
972.9
133.4
1,619.8
78.8
53.3
1,193.3
14.2
1,571.6
9,978.2

197.3
385.3
1,674.7
656.7
1,790.8
1,124.5
189
1,818.1
236.2
1,294
76.2
1,044.2

351.7
24.8
1,050.9
730
1,620.4
777.4
71.9
1,787.2
128.6
1,322
213.3
504.4
2,395.9

876
459.9
2,451.3
37
633
776
112
2,296.6
0
70
0
1,439
285.3
154.4
1,068.4

540.5
1,492.2
1,369
2,726.6
850.6
1,546.1
1,598
411.7
109.5
2,206.1

178.1
338.1
1,405.2
1,702
3,043
506.6
317
2,562.5
200
20
213
1,452
370
34.4
1,395.9

0
280.8
2,440.5
1,608
3,157
951.2
425
2,781.8
10
0
120
1,799
78.6
456
605.3

10,487

10,978.5

10,658.9

12,850.3

13,737.8

14,713.2
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*Years 2000 and 2001 are represented in Euro Millions pursuant to 1999
Statute of the EIB change.
Table 6:
Percentage of Total EIB Loans Designated Regional
Development 1995-2001
EU
Member
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Austria
Netherlands
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United
Kingdom

1995
21%
36%
41%
51%
90%
44%
41%
47%
100%
22%
97%
8%
70%

1996

1997

30%
56%
54%
91%
70%
45%
100%
44%
48%
100%
9%
44%

1998

31%
3%
30%
100%
60%
29%
35%
51%
23%
98%
53%
55%
64%

67%
62%
47%
51%
20%
27%
43%
67%
20%
96%
52%
23%
35%

1999

2000

60%
27%
95%
67%
20%
38%
100%
71%
20%
66%

2001

35%
34%
23%
99%
72%
15%
75%
45%
100%
7%
28%
78%
70%
5%
42%

24%
41%
97%
69%
24%
81%
51%
100%
15%
100%
11%
48%
26%

Table 7:
EU Member States’ Percentage of Total EIB Lending:
1995-2001
EU
Member
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Austria
Netherlands
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United
Kingdom

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Total**

4%
5%
15%
3%
16%
12%
2%
19%
1%
2%
7%
1%
2%
12%

3%
3%
15%
4%
12%
12%
1%
20%
2%
4%
6%
2%
4%
12%

5%
4%
16%
3%
12%
10%
1%
16%
2%
2%
6%
2%
4%
17%

4%
3%
21%
3%
13%
11%
1%
18%
1%
2%
6%
2%
3%
12%

8%
3%
19%
5%
14%
15%
14%
2%
1%
5%
2%
2%
11%

2%
3%
20%
6%
14%
11%
1%
19%
1%
2%
1%
6%
2%
2%
11%

1%
4%
19%
5%
15%
12%
2%
18%
3%
3%
6%
2%
3%
8%

4%
3%
15%
8%
12%
12%
3%
18%
2%
2%
6%
2%
3%
12%
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Table 8:
EU Member States’ Percentage of Total EIB Regional
Development Lending:1995-2001
EU
Member
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Austria
Netherlands
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United
Kingdom

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Total**

1%
3%
11%
3%
25%
10%
1%
16%
1%
1%
12%
16%

2%
4%
16%
6%
17%
11%
2%
17%
2%
12%
10%

3%
10%
7%
15%
7%
1%
16%
1%
12%
2%
5%
22%

8%
4%
23%
6%
7%
1%
22%
1%
14%
3%
1%
10%

4%
12%
11%
21%
7%
12%
12%
3%
1%
17%

1%
3%
10%
12%
22%
4%
2%
19%
2%
2%
11%
3%
10%

2%
17%
11%
22%
7%
3%
19%
1%
12%
1%
3%
4%

2%
3%
14%
8%
18%
8%
2%
17%
1%
12%
2%
2%
12%

*Percentages in tables 7 and 8 have been rounded to the nearest whole
percentage
**Total columns in tables 7 and 8 indicate total percentage during 19952001
Examining these data discloses information regarding two member
countries, Spain and the Netherlands. The EIB loans indicate that the
Netherlands, during the time period studied received only 20 EUR in regional
development loans that equates to less than 1 percent of the total EIB
regional development loans received for all other member nations. Spain,
however, received 15,197.2 million EUR during this same time period that
equates to 18 percent of all regional development loans issued by the EIB.
Spain received the highest percentage of regional development loans during
the research period. The EIB regional development loans to Spain during
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this period equal 72 percent of all EIB loans to Spain. Italy, second to Spain,
received 14,412.1 million EUR or 17 percent of regional development loans in
the EU. Germany received 11627.5 million EUR or 14 percent of all regional
development lending. Portugal and the United Kingdom both received 12
percent of EIB regional development lending for the time period examined.
Table 9 illustrates these member nations GDP during this time (Eurostat
2003).
Table 9:

Netherlands
Spain
Italy
Portugal
Germany
United
Kingdom

GDP Per Capita in Purchasing Power Standards
1995
108.6
79
104.2
66
107.8
99.9

1996
109
79.5
104
66.2
107.1
101.2

1997
109.8
79.7
102.5
67.2
105.1
103.6

1998
110.1
81
103.2
68.5
103.9
103.4

1999
109.7
83.5
101.9
70.2
103.1
103

2000
110.7
83.4
101.3
70.4
102
103.9

2001
113.3
84.3
100.1
70.6
100.5
105.1

Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of economic activity. It is
defined as the value of all goods and services produced less the value of any
goods or services used in their creation (Eurostat 2003). Purchasing Power
Standards (PPS) is a common currency used in European Union country
comparisons to eliminate the differences in price levels of individual member
nations.1
The GDP of Spain and the Netherlands illustrates the ineffectiveness of
the European Investment Bank to address the regional development gap
Four of the six countries listed maintain the largest populations in the EU,
with Germany ranking the largest, followed by the UK, Italy and Spain
respectively. Portugal has the lowest population in this data set, but still is
the 9th highest in population. Netherlands has the 6th largest population in
EU.
1
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existing within the European Union. The gap that existed between the
Netherlands and Spain in 1995 is still apparent in 2001. These data indicate
that the EIB efforts in Spain were futile in terms of promoting balanced
development within the European Union. The selection of these two
countries for analysis was based on the financing received from the EIB.
They represent the spectrum of economic development within the European
Union; the two countries are on opposite ends of this spectrum. The trend
between Spain and Netherlands is indicative of the trends existing in terms of
economic development within the European Union. These data and findings
represent the inability of the EIB to resolve the regional development gap as
intended with its creation. Based on these findings within the European
Union, it can be concluded the European Investment Bank will also be
impotent when additional countries seek admission to the Union. The trends
indicated in this time period do not indicate an effort on the part of the
European Investment Bank to increase financing projects in the sphere of
regional development. The percentage of funding for regional development
was at its highest (during the research period) in 1995 and declined from
that point until 2000. The percentage fell below 50 percent in 1997. This
does not indicate a solid effort by the EIB to address the regional
development gap.
Italy and Germany illustrate another contradiction to the EIB goals.
Italy’s and Germany’s GDPs are not as low as Spain; however, they still
received a large portion of regional development lending. The GDP did not
improve over this time period, but declined in both countries instead. This
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reveals two possible conclusions. The EIB was not effective in triggering GDP
growth in Italy and Germany or the GDP decline was lessened by EIB
involvement. The findings regarding Italy and Germany expose another
possible research avenue regarding the European Investment Bank.
Portugal’s and the UK’s GDPs did not decline during this period, but the gap
between each of these member nations and the Netherlands did not seem to
improve. Portugal’s GDP is actually less than Spain’s but received less
regional development lending and the lending it did receive did not improve
the GDP during the research period. The United Kingdom has a better GDP,
but the regional development lending did not produce a significant
improvement to the GDP. The UK GDP is closer to that of the Netherlands,
but 12 percent of all regional development lending was unable to close the
gap between these two member nations.
The UK GDP is close to and in some years surpasses the average GDP
for the European Union, yet still receives 12 percent of regional development
lending for the research period. Portugal received the same percentage of
regional development lending however; Portugal’s GDP fell well below the EU
average GDP. The average GDP of the European Union during the research
period is 100 PPS (Eurostat 2003). Spain received the most regional
development lending in this time period. Spain’s GDP was below the
average, but it was higher than that of Portugal.

Germany and Italy GDP

were above the EU average, yet they both received relatively high
percentages of regional development lending. Political factors agreements
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play a role in EIB lending. Regional Development may be the foremost
concern of the EIB but political factors weigh in lending decisions.
The research data indicates the development gap between the EU
member nations in terms of GDP. An examination of several of the nations
during 1995-2001 illustrates the insignificance of the European Investment
Bank to improve GDP and close this economic gap.
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Chapter Five
Conclusions

In the preceding chapters, I have presented a case study of the
European Investment Banks lending between 1995 and 2001. In Chapter
two I described the origin and development of the European Investment
Bank and its mission of balanced economic development from the Treaty of
Rome in 1958 through the Treaty of Nice in 2003. I also included in this
chapter a summary and review of the main documents of the EU relating to
the EIB. These documents provided a foundation for the case study and the
framework on which to test, in Chapter four, the proposition established in
Chapter one. Chapter three provided a general overview of the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This summary confirmed the
member states’ concern for regional development and the additional
institutions they created in 1991 to combat the development gap problem.
In chapter four, I offered evidence to test the proposition that the member
states have not been successful in closing differences in levels of
development among themselves. An examination of lending patterns with
the European Union by the EIB particularly in tables 7, 8 and 9 demonstrated
where EIB funding has been directed and how it benefited the member state.
The analysis offered in the preceding chapters suggests that the
European Investment Bank investment practices have not been effective in
fulfilling its mission of balanced development among the member states of
the European Union. First, as indicated in Table 8, EIB regional development
lending between 1995 and 2001 was distributed in a bimodal manner. Within
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this distribution, some member states, such as Greece and Ireland, received
far less than more developed member states (i.e., United Kingdom and
Italy). Second, during the same period, EIB lending did not correspond with a
reduction in the develop gap among all the member states. While the relative
distribution of GDP per capita purchasing power among the five member
states who received the largest portion of EIB lending did change in some
cases (e.g., between Spain and Italy), the overall gap continues to be
significant among even the largest recipients of EIB lending (Table 9). An
examination of the GDP of the member states was used as one economic
measure of the effectiveness of EIB lending. Examining the lending of the
EIB to the member nations of the European Union demonstrates that the
regional development gap continues to be a problem.
The concept of a balanced economic community envisioned with the
Treaty of Rome in 1957 has yet to come to realization. The European
Investment, by its own Protocol, was developed to promote balanced
economic growth. This cannot be attained without addressing the regional
development gap between the existing member countries. The creation of
the EIB and The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development indicate
the concern of the European Union for balanced economic development.
Additional findings from this research illustrate that the bank has not
been able to fulfill its mission. Lending data of the Bank indicates several
factors regarding the Bank’s efforts. The Bank’s own Protocol defines its task
as contributing to a balanced development of the common market for the
interest of the entire community. The data suggest that the Bank’s
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contributions, loans, have not significantly improved economic development
as defined by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Consequently, the European
Union can not rely only on the EIB to institute balanced regional development
either for its current members or for the new members that will be added in
May 2004. Since the Bank has not been able to significantly reduce the gap
among the current member states, the addition of more members will make
its mission even more difficult to fulfill.
The historical overview of the development of the European Union
from the Common Market stage through the current European Union
illustrates the political undertones of enlargement and the continued problem
of balanced development. The goal of the EU is integration on several levels,
including economy. The Common Market was the beginning process of
economic integration. The political influences are prevalent throughout this
process. The enlargement stages appear to be concerned with integration,
but candidate countries and member nation may have separate agendas that
are more nationalistic than supranational. These enlargement stages
illustrate the development gaps that were present during the Common
Market stage and continued throughout each enlargement. The
interdependence of European economies was prevalent prior to integration
and sometimes resulted in application for entry into the EU, as with Ireland.
The weak economy of Ireland exemplifies the development gap existing in
the European Union. The rhetoric of balanced development of the European
Union is overshadowed by political motivations for enlargement in many
cases. The concern in expanding a free market economy, particularly in
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candidate countries from Eastern Europe is greater than an ensuing regional
development gap that is continuing to grow.
The continued growth of the EU is not taken into consideration in the
EIB’s capital base. Since its inception the average amount of subscribed
capital paid has only increased 1.5 percent. The average amount of paid
subscribed capital was increased in 1999 with the Statute of the European
Investment Bank. The addition of 10 members to the EU will apply additional
pressure to the existing insufficient subscribed capital under these
circumstances.
The review of the Protocol of The European Investment Bank and other
documents of the European Union indicate the Union’s concern for balanced
regional development and the desire for a balanced economic environment.
The EIB’s mandate has not significantly altered since its inception in 1957
with the Treaty of Rome. Other literature on the European Investment Bank
touches on other areas of the bank, including sustainable development, but
leaves a void in the area of economic analysis and significance of the EIB.
This research fills this space with reliable data to evaluate the effectiveness
of the EIB in promoting regional economic balance. The lending patterns
researched do not hold much promise for the EIB, on its own, to solve the
regional development gap.
Future research will need to identify other factors present in the world
economic environment that may be hindering balanced development within
the European Union. Further research should also consider the other
programs the EIB supports and how these lending programs may be affecting
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the regional development gap. The research has indicated that at best
during the research period only 55 percent of total EIB loans were directed to
addressing the regional development problem. The European Investment
Bank, although created to aid in the balanced development, has been shown
to be less successful than its mission indicates in its efforts to stimulate
economic growth and thereby reduce regional economic differences among
the current members of the EU. New members of the Union would increase
this burden and possibly render the EIB even less effective in assisting in this
endeavor. Finally, future research should be undertaken to address the
political factors that effect economic development gaps among the member
states. In the introductory chapter, I described the various initiatives that
led to the enlargement of the Common Market members from six in 1958 to
the current fifteen members of the European Union. Each enlargement was
preceded by considerable political negotiations. While the EIB had to address
the consequences of these decisions, its capacity to effectively do so to close
the development gap was reduced because its resources did not increase
accordingly. Hence, future research should take into consideration the
extent to which the persistence of the development gap among the member
states is also a result of decisions outside the control of either the EIB or
market forces.
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Appendix A: Protocol Establishing the European Investment Bank

Article 1: The EIB is established by Article 266 of the Treaty and shall
function in accordance with that article and the provisions of the following
protocol. The seat of the Bank will be determined by common accord of the
governments of the member states.
Article 2: The task of the bank is defined in Article 267 of the Treaty.
Article 3: The members of the EIB shall be the following:
The Kingdom of Belgium
The Kingdom of Denmark
The Federal Republic of Germany
The Hellenic Republic
The Kingdom of Spain
The French Republic
Ireland
The Italian Republic
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
The Kingdom of the Netherlands
The Republic of Austria
The Portuguese Republic
The Republic of Finland
The Kingdom of Sweden
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Article 4: Designates the unit of account for the European Investment Bank
shall be ECU as used by the European Community. The Board of Governors
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Board of Directors may alter this
definition. The capital of the bank shall be ECU 62 013 million as subscribed
by the member states as follows:
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Table 10:

Subscribed Capital of the European Investment
Bank

Germany

11,017,450,00

France

11,017,450,00

Italy

11,017,450,00

United Kingdom

11,017,450,00

Spain

4,049,856,000

Belgium

3,053,960,000

Netherlands

3,053,960,000

Sweden

2,026,000,000

Denmark

1,546,308,000

Austria

1,516,000,000

Finland

871,000,000

Greece

828,380,000

Portugal

533,844,000

Ireland

386,576,000

Luxembourg

77,316,000

Member states are only liable to the amount of their share of the capital
subscribed and not paid up. An addition of a new member will result in an
increase of the subscribed capital corresponding to the capital brought by the
new member. Board of Governors of the EIB may decide, unanimously, to
increase the subscribed capital. A member’s share in the subscribed capital
may not be transferred, pledged or attached.
Article 5: Subscribed capital shall be paid in by the member state to the
extent of 7.50162895 percent on the average of the amounts defined in
Article 4. In the event of an increase in subscribed capital, the Board of
Governors may unanimously fix the percentage to be paid up and make
arrangements for payments. The Board of Directors may require payment of
the balance of subscribed capital in the event the Bank has to meet
obligations to those who have made loans to the Bank. Each Member state
would make payment in proportion to its share of the subscribed capital in
the currency required by the Bank in order to meet its obligations.
Article 6: In the event the bank is unable to obtain the necessary funds on
the capital markets for a specific project, The Board of Governors, acting on
a proposal from the Board of Directors may decide that member nations
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grant special interest loans to the bank. These special loans may not be
called for until the beginning of the fourth year after entry into force of this
treaty. These loans may not exceed 400 million unit of account in aggregate
or 100 million units of account per annum. The terms of special loans will be
related to the term of the loan or guarantee the Bank proposes to grant, but
will not exceed 20 years. The Board of Governors, acting on a proposal from
the Board of Directors may decide on prior repayment of special loans.
These special loans will bear an interest rate of 4 percent per annum, unless
otherwise specified by the Board of Governors. The Member States will grant
special loans in proportion to their shares in the subscribed capital of the
Bank. The payment will be made in the national currency and due within 6
months of being called for. In the event the Bank would go into liquidation,
these special loans will only be repaid to the Member Nations after all other
debts of the Bank are settled.
Article 7: In the event a Member State’s currency value in relation to the
unit of account defined in Article 4 is reduced, that State will adjust the
amount of the subscribed capital share in proportion to the change in value
by making a supplementary payment to the Bank. Likewise, if the value of
the currency increases, the Bank will make repayment to the State in
proportion to this change.
Market rates determine the rate for converting Member State’s currency to
the unit of account and vice versa. The Board of Governors acting on a
proposal from the Board of Directors may alter this conversion method.
Article 8: The Bank will be comprised of a Board of Governors, a Board of
Directors and a Management Committee.
Article 9: The Board of Governors consists of ministers appointed by the
Member States and has the following duties:
1. Defines and insures implementation of the credit policy of the Bank.
This policy should reference the objectives to be attained as
progressing toward a common market.
2. Decides on whether to increase the subscribed capital (Article 4).
3. Decides on issues involving special loans (Article 6).
4. Authorizes investment loans outside the Member States (Article 18).
5. Appoints the Board of Directors and Management Committee, decides
on compulsory retirement of those members and the duties of those
members.
6. Has the authority to vary the number of members on the Management
Committee
7. Approves the annual report of the Board of Directors.
8. Approves the profit and loss account and the balance sheet.
9. Approves the Rules of Procedure of the Bank.
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10. Defines the unit of account of the subscribed capital.
11. May alter the method of converting from national currencies to the
unit of account and vice versa.
12.Has the authority to suspend loans or guarantees to a Member States
if that Member State has failed to meet its obligations of membership
in the Bank.
13.Has the authority to decide to suspend the operations of the Bank.
14.In the event of liquidation, has the authority to appoint liquidators and
oversee liquidation.
Article 10: Unless otherwise specifically stated in the Bank’s Statute,
decisions by the Board of Governors require a majority of its members. The
majority must represent at least 50 percent of the subscribed capital.
Article 11: Describes the duties and make up of the Board of Directors. The
Board of Directors has sole power to make decisions regarding loans and
guarantees and raising loans. Is has the authority to fix interest on loans
granted and commission on guarantees. The Board of Directors is
responsible for insuring the Bank is properly run and managed in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty and Statute and implementation of
directives issued by the Board of Governors. The Board of Directors will also
submit a report to the Board of Directors at the end of each financial year
and publish it when the Board of Directors approves it. The Board of
Directors consists of 25 Directors and 13 Alternatives and is appointed and
can be renewed by the Board of Governors for a term of 5 years as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Three directors nominated by the Federal Republic of Germany
Three directors nominated by the French Republic
Three directors nominated by the Italian Republic
Three directors nominated by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland
Two directors nominated by the Kingdom of Spain
One director nominated by the Kingdom of Belgium
One director nominated by the Kingdom of Denmark
One director nominated by the Hellenic Republic
One director nominated by Ireland
One director nominated by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
One director nominated by the Kingdom of the Netherlands
One director nominated by the Republic of Austria
One director nominated by the Portuguese Republic
One director nominated by the Republic of Finland
One director nominated by the Kingdom of Sweden
One director nominated by the Commission

Alternatives will also be appointed and can be renewed by the Board of
Governors for a term of 5 years as follows:
•

Two alternatives nominated by the Federal Republic of Germany
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Two alternatives nominated by the French Republic
Two alternatives nominated by the Italian Republic
Two alternatives nominated by the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
One alternative nominated by mutual agreement between the
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic
One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement of the Benelux
countries
One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement between the
Kingdom of Denmark, the Hellenic Republic and Ireland
One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement between the
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of
Sweden
One alternative nominated by the Commission

Alternatives may take part in Board of Directors meetings, but have no right
of vote unless they have replaced an appointed director. The President of
the Management Committee or one of the Vice Presidents will preside over
the Board of Directors meetings, but will not have a vote. Directors and
alternatives are responsible only to the Bank.
Any Director may be forced into retirement if he no longer fulfils the
conditions required by a qualified majority of the Board of Directors. Any
vacancy arising on the board would result in a replacement for the remainder
of term unless the entire Board of Directors is being replaced.
The Board of Governors determines the number of members on the Board of
Directors and also acting unanimously determines what activities are
considered incompatible with the duties of a director or alternate.
Article 12: Each director on the Board of Directors is entitled to one vote and
can delegate this vote in all cases. Unless otherwise specified the decisions
of the Board of Directors require a simple majority of members entitled to
vote. A qualified majority (at this time) requires 17 votes in favor. The
Rules of Procedure of the European Investment Bank determines the quorum
required for the adoption of decisions.
Article 13: The Management Committee consists of a President and six VicePresidents appointed by the Board of Governors for a renewable term of 6
years. The Board of Directors, acting unanimously, may also alter the
number of members on the management committee. A qualified majority of
the Board of Governors acting on a qualified proposal of the Board of
Directors may compulsorily retire a member of the Committee.
The responsibilities and duties of the Management Committee include
preparing decisions of the Board of Directors regarding the granting of loans
and guarantees, insuring these decisions are implemented. The Committee
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is responsible for the current business of the bank under the authority of the
President and the supervision of the Board of Directors. The Management
Committee will deliver opinions or proposals about loans and guarantees and
will do so by a majority of the Committee.
All staff and officials of the European Investment Bank will work under the
authority of the President of the Management Committee. Hiring and firing
of staff will be the responsibility of the President and this staff will be of
equitable representation of the Member States. The President or Vice
President in the event the President is unable, represents the Bank in
judicial, as well as other matters. The Management Committee and staff are
only responsible to the Bank and are completely independent.
Article 14: The Board of Governors will appoint a committee of three
members to annually verify the operations of the Bank. The verification of
the books will include confirmation of the balance sheet and profit/loss
statements reflect the position of the Bank.
Article 15: The Bank will conduct its business through the authority
designated by the State and will have recourse to the bank of issue of the
Member State concerned or another financial institution approved by the
State.
Article 16: The Bank will cooperate with all international organizations similar
to themselves and will establish contacts, in the interest of cooperation, with
other banking and financial institutions in the countries where Bank
operations extend.
Article 17: The Board of Governors, at the request of a Member State or The
Commission or its own initiative, will implement the directives set forth in
Article 9 of this Statute.
Article 18: The Bank will grant loans to its members or to private or public
undertakings for investment with the European territories of the Member
States, in the event funds are not available from other sources and with
reasonable terms. The Bank may grant loans for investment outside the
European territories when authorized by the Board of Governors acting on a
proposal from the Board of Directors.
Loans or grants to a body other than a Member State, the loan or grant
should be guaranteed by the Member State where the project is being carried
out or other adequate guarantees. The Bank may also guarantee loans
contracted by public or private entities as provided for in the Treaty.
The total amount of loans and guarantees at any time will not exceed 250
percent of the subscribed capital of the Bank. The Bank has the authority to
protect itself against risk by placing clauses in the loans and guarantees, as it
considers appropriate.

57

Appendix A : (Continued)
Article 19: Interest rates on loans and guarantees shall be determined by
the capital market and calculated to allow the Bank to meet its obligations
and cover its operating expenses. The Bank cannot reduce interest rates.
The Member State or another agency concerned may grant aid towards the
payment of interest.
Article 20: The Bank shall adhere to the following operating principles in
regard to loans and guarantees:
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Ensure that funds are used rationally in the interest of the European
Community.
The Bank may only grant loans or guarantees where the project
increases economic production and promotes the goal of the common
market. Loans and grants in the production sector can be covered by
the operating profits of the Bank or by a commitment by the State
where the project is carried out.
The Bank will not gain any interest in or assume any management
responsibility of a project unless it is required to ensure repayment of
funds to the Bank.
The Bank can dispose of its claims on the capital market and require
its debtors to issue bonds or other forms of security.
The Bank or a Member State cannot require that funds lent by the
Bank be used in a specific Member State.
Loans can be conditional on international tender being arranged.
The Bank may not under any circumstances finance a project to be
carried out in a Member State where the project is opposed by that
Member State.

Article 21: Procedures regarding attainment of loans and guarantees:
•
•
•
•
•

Applications can be make to the Bank through the Commission or
Member State where the project will be carried out.
Applications made through the Commission will be submitted to the
involved Member State for opinion: applications made through a
Member State will be submitted to the Commission for an opinion.
These opinions must be submitted within 2 months of the application,
no response will indicate to the Bank that there is no objection to the
project.
Applications submitted by the Management Committee will be ruled on
by the Board of Directors.
The Management Committee decides whether submitted applications
comply with the Statute of the Bank. If in favor of granting the loan or
guarantee, the Management Committee, will submit a draft contract to
the Board of Directors. If the Management Committee is against an
application for loan or guarantee, it will also submit this opinion to the
Board of Directors
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•
•

•

The Board of Directors cannot grant the loan or guarantee if the
opinion of the Management Committee is unfavorable, unless it is a
unanimous decision by the Board of Directors.
This policy is the same for The Commission when delivering an
unfavorable opinion, except when the Board of Directors votes on the
loan application, the Director nominated by the Commission must
abstain from the vote.
In the event both The Commission and The Management Committee
deliver unfavorable opinions about the proposed loan or guarantee, the
Board of Directors may not grant the loan or guarantee.

Article 22: The Bank generates the funds necessary for its purposes by
borrowing on the international capital markets. This includes borrowing on
the capital market of any Member State. If the Member State does not have
any legal provisions for this, the Member State and the Bank may reach an
agreement about the individual loan. The Member State has the right to
refuse to agree to the loan in the event it would cause a disturbance in the
capital market of that Member State.
Article 23: The Bank generates funds to meet its obligations by the
following:
•
•
•

Investing in money markets
Buying and selling securities issued by the Bank or by those who have
borrowed from it
Any financial operation linked to its objectives

The Bank cannot engage in currency arbitrage unless it is required to fulfill its
obligations. The Bank will act in agreement with the bank or authorities of
the concerned Member State.
Article 24: A reserve fund of 10 percent of the subscribed capital will be
progressively amassed. The Board of Directors has the authority to grant
additional reserves if the liabilities of the Bank justify additional reserves.
The fund is developed from the interest received from loans granted by the
Bank. This reserve fund is separate from the income required to meet the
Bank’s obligations. The reserve fund will be invested in manner that allows
quick availability (liquidity).
Article 25: The Bank can transfer its assets into the currency from one
Member State to another Member State to perform its operations. These
transfers should be avoided if the Bank already has cash or liquid assets in
the currency required. The Bank cannot transfer its assets in the currency of
a Member State to that of a third country without the Member State’s
agreement. The Bank is free to dispose of any of its capital, which is paid up
in convertible currency, and any currency borrowed on markets outside the
Community. Members States are required to make currency available to
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the debtors of the Bank, so that they may repay interest and commissions on
loans to the Bank.
Article 26: A qualified majority of the Board of Governors may suspend
service to a Member state if that State fails to meet its obligations to the
Bank. These obligations include paying its share of the subscribed capital,
granting special loans or servicing its borrowers. This suspension does not
release the Member State from its obligations to the Bank.
Article 27: The Board of Governors, in the event of liquidation, will appoint
the liquidators and instruct them on carrying out the liquidation. In the
event of liquidation, the Bank operations will cease, except for those
processes, which are necessary to preserve its assets and to settle its
liabilities.
Article 28: The property of the Bank is exempt from any expropriation.
The Bank will assume the most legal capacities under the law in each of the
Member State, particularly those laws referring to acquiring and disposing of
property.
Article 29: Disputes between the Bank and its creditors, debtors and others
will be decided by the national courts, except where the jurisdiction lies with
the Court of Justice. The Bank will have an address for its service in each
Member State. Any property of the Bank is not liable to attachment or
seizure except by a decision of a court.
Article 30: The Board of Governors acting unanimously can establish a
European Investment Fund of which the Bank would be a founding member.
The Board of Governors would also establish the Statute of The European
Investment Fund, which would define the objectives, structure, membership,
financial resources, auditing of the Fund, as well as the relationship between
the Bank and the Fund.
The Bank would participate in the management of the Fund and contribute to
its subscribed capital. The European Community may also become members
of the Fund and contribute to its subscribed capital. The invitation to become
a member is also open to financial institutions.
The protocol regarding privileges of the European Community would apply to
the Fund and its members. The Fund is not subject to any form of taxation
either when in operation or in the event of liquidation or dissolution. Any
dividends, revenue or capital gains to members of the Fund, other than the
Community and the Bank, will remain subject to applicable legislation. The
Court of Justice will maintain jurisdiction over disputes within the Fund.
This protocol essentially establishes the European Bank and these
principles are relatively unchanged, as is the structure the Bank. Review of
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additional European Union documents will illustrate the minor changes that
have been instituted with the Bank.
A decision of the representatives of The Governments of the Member
States on the provisional location of certain institutions and departments of
the Communities was signed in April 1965 and establishes the location of the
EIB. The European Investment Bank will be located in Luxembourg and all
meetings of the Bank will occur there. All activities of the Bank will be
carried out from this location.
Member states are only liable to the amount of their share of the capital
subscribed and not paid up. An addition of a new member will result in an
increase of the subscribed capital corresponding to the capital brought by the
new member. Board of Governors of the EIB may decide, unanimously, to
increase the subscribed capital. A member’s share in the subscribed capital
may not be transferred, pledged or attached.
Article 5: Subscribed capital shall be paid in by the member state to the
extent of 7.50162895 percent on the average of the amounts defined in
Article 4. In the event of an increase in subscribed capital, the Board of
Governors may unanimously fix the percentage to be paid up and make
arrangements for payments. The Board of Directors may require payment of
the balance of subscribed capital in the event the Bank has to meet
obligations to those who have made loans to the Bank. Each Member state
would make payment in proportion to its share of the subscribed capital in
the currency required by the Bank in order to meet its obligations.
Article 6: In the event the bank is unable to obtain the necessary funds on
the capital markets for a specific project, The Board of Governors, acting on
a proposal from the Board of Directors may decide that member nations
grant special interest loans to the bank. These special loans may not be
called for until the beginning of the fourth year after entry into force of this
treaty. These loans may not exceed 400 million unit of account in aggregate
or 100 million units of account per annum. The terms of special loans will be
related to the term of the loan or guarantee the Bank proposes to grant, but
will not exceed 20 years. The Board of Governors, acting on a proposal from
the Board of Directors may decide on prior repayment of special loans.
These special loans will bear an interest rate of 4 percent per annum, unless
otherwise specified by the Board of Governors. The Member States will grant
special loans in proportion to their shares in the subscribed capital of the
Bank. The payment will be made in the national currency and due within 6
months of being called for. In the event the Bank would go into liquidation,
these special loans will only be repaid to the Member Nations after all other
debts of the Bank are settled.
Article 7: In the event a Member State’s currency value in relation to the
unit of account defined in Article 4 is reduced, that State will adjust the
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amount of the subscribed capital share in proportion to the change in value
by making a supplementary payment to the Bank. Likewise, if the value of
the currency increases, the Bank will make repayment to the State in
proportion to this change.
Market rates determine the rate for converting Member State’s currency to
the unit of account and vice versa. The Board of Governors acting on a
proposal from the Board of Directors may alter this conversion method.
Article 8: The Bank will be comprised of a Board of Governors, a Board of
Directors and a Management Committee.
Article 9: The Board of Governors consists of ministers appointed by the
Member States and has the following duties:
15.Defines and insures implementation of the credit policy of the Bank.
This policy should reference the objectives to be attained as
progressing toward a common market.
16.Decides on whether to increase the subscribed capital (Article 4).
17.Decides on issues involving special loans (Article 6).
18.Authorizes investment loans outside the Member States (Article 18).
19.Appoints the Board of Directors and Management Committee, decides
on compulsory retirement of those members and the duties of those
members.
20.Has the authority to vary the number of members on the Management
Committee
21.Approves the annual report of the Board of Directors.
22.Approves the profit and loss account and the balance sheet.
23.Approves the Rules of Procedure of the Bank.
24. Defines the unit of account of the subscribed capital.
25. May alter the method of converting from national currencies to the
unit of account and vice versa.
26.Has the authority to suspend loans or guarantees to a Member States
if that Member State has failed to meet its obligations of membership
in the Bank.
27.Has the authority to decide to suspend the operations of the Bank.
28.In the event of liquidation, has the authority to appoint liquidators and
oversee liquidation.
Article 10: Unless otherwise specifically stated in the Bank’s Statute,
decisions by the Board of Governors require a majority of its members. The
majority must represent at least 50 percent of the subscribed capital.
Article 11: Describes the duties and make up of the Board of Directors. The
Board of Directors has sole power to make decisions regarding loans and
guarantees and raising loans. Is has the authority to fix interest on loans
granted and commission on guarantees. The Board of Directors is
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responsible for insuring the Bank is properly run and managed in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty and Statute and implementation of
directives issued by the Board of Governors. The Board of Directors will also
submit a report to the Board of Directors at the end of each financial year
and publish it when the Board of Directors approves it. The Board of
Directors consists of 25 Directors and 13 Alternatives and is appointed and
can be renewed by the Board of Governors for a term of 5 years as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Three directors nominated by the Federal Republic of Germany
Three directors nominated by the French Republic
Three directors nominated by the Italian Republic
Three directors nominated by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland
Two directors nominated by the Kingdom of Spain
One director nominated by the Kingdom of Belgium
One director nominated by the Kingdom of Denmark
One director nominated by the Hellenic Republic
One director nominated by Ireland
One director nominated by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
One director nominated by the Kingdom of the Netherlands
One director nominated by the Republic of Austria
One director nominated by the Portuguese Republic
One director nominated by the Republic of Finland
One director nominated by the Kingdom of Sweden
One director nominated by the Commission

Alternatives will also be appointed and can be renewed by the Board of
Governors for a term of 5 years as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Two alternatives nominated by the Federal Republic of Germany
Two alternatives nominated by the French Republic
Two alternatives nominated by the Italian Republic
Two alternatives nominated by the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
One alternative nominated by mutual agreement between the
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic
One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement of the Benelux
countries
One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement between the
Kingdom of Denmark, the Hellenic Republic and Ireland
One alternative nominated by the mutual agreement between the
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of
Sweden
One alternative nominated by the Commission

Alternatives may take part in Board of Directors meetings, but have no right
of vote unless they have replaced an appointed director. The President of
the Management Committee or one of the Vice Presidents will preside over
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the Board of Directors meetings, but will not have a vote. Directors and
alternatives are responsible only to the Bank.
Any Director may be forced into retirement if he no longer fulfils the
conditions required by a qualified majority of the Board of Directors. Any
vacancy arising on the board would result in a replacement for the remainder
of term unless the entire Board of Directors is being replaced.
The Board of Governors determines the number of members on the Board of
Directors and also acting unanimously determines what activities are
considered incompatible with the duties of a director or alternate.
Article 12: Each director on the Board of Directors is entitled to one vote and
can delegate this vote in all cases. Unless otherwise specified the decisions
of the Board of Directors require a simple majority of members entitled to
vote. A qualified majority (at this time) requires 17 votes in favor. The
Rules of Procedure of the European Investment Bank determines the quorum
required for the adoption of decisions.
Article 13: The Management Committee consists of a President and six VicePresidents appointed by the Board of Governors for a renewable term of 6
years. The Board of Directors, acting unanimously, may also alter the
number of members on the management committee. A qualified majority of
the Board of Governors acting on a qualified proposal of the Board of
Directors may compulsorily retire a member of the Committee.
The responsibilities and duties of the Management Committee include
preparing decisions of the Board of Directors regarding the granting of loans
and guarantees, insuring these decisions are implemented. The Committee
is responsible for the current business of the bank under the authority of the
President and the supervision of the Board of Directors. The Management
Committee will deliver opinions or proposals about loans and guarantees and
will do so by a majority of the Committee.
All staff and officials of the European Investment Bank will work under the
authority of the President of the Management Committee. Hiring and firing
of staff will be the responsibility of the President and this staff will be of
equitable representation of the Member States. The President or Vice
President in the event the President is unable, represents the Bank in
judicial, as well as other matters. The Management Committee and staff are
only responsible to the Bank and are completely independent.
Article 14: The Board of Governors will appoint a committee of three
members to annually verify the operations of the Bank. The verification of
the books will include confirmation of the balance sheet and profit/loss
statements reflect the position of the Bank.
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Article 15: The Bank will conduct its business through the authority
designated by the State and will have recourse to the bank of issue of the
Member State concerned or another financial institution approved by the
State.
Article 16: The Bank will cooperate with all international organizations similar
to themselves and will establish contacts, in the interest of cooperation, with
other banking and financial institutions in the countries where Bank
operations extend.
Article 17: The Board of Governors, at the request of a Member State or The
Commission or its own initiative, will implement the directives set forth in
Article 9 of this Statute.
Article 18: The Bank will grant loans to its members or to private or public
undertakings for investment with the European territories of the Member
States, in the event funds are not available from other sources and with
reasonable terms. The Bank may grant loans for investment outside the
European territories when authorized by the Board of Governors acting on a
proposal from the Board of Directors.
Loans or grants to a body other than a Member State, the loan or grant
should be guaranteed by the Member State where the project is being carried
out or other adequate guarantees. The Bank may also guarantee loans
contracted by public or private entities as provided for in the Treaty.
The total amount of loans and guarantees at any time will not exceed 250
percent of the subscribed capital of the Bank. The Bank has the authority to
protect itself against risk by placing clauses in the loans and guarantees, as it
considers appropriate.
Article 19: Interest rates on loans and guarantees shall be determined by
the capital market and calculated to allow the Bank to meet its obligations
and cover its operating expenses. The Bank cannot reduce interest rates.
The Member State or another agency concerned may grant aid towards the
payment of interest.
Article 20: The Bank shall adhere to the following operating principles in
regard to loans and guarantees:
•
•

Ensure that funds are used rationally in the interest of the European
Community.
The Bank may only grant loans or guarantees where the project
increases economic production and promotes the goal of the common
market. Loans and grants in the production sector can be covered by
the operating profits of the Bank or by a commitment by the State
where the project is carried out.
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•
•
•
•
•

The Bank will not gain any interest in or assume any management
responsibility of a project unless it is required to ensure repayment of
funds to the Bank.
The Bank can dispose of its claims on the capital market and require
its debtors to issue bonds or other forms of security.
The Bank or a Member State cannot require that funds lent by the
Bank be used in a specific Member State.
Loans can be conditional on international tender being arranged.
The Bank may not under any circumstances finance a project to be
carried out in a Member State where the project is opposed by that
Member State.

Article 21: Procedures regarding attainment of loans and guarantees:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•

Applications can be make to the Bank through the Commission or
Member State where the project will be carried out.
Applications made through the Commission will be submitted to the
involved Member State for opinion: applications made through a
Member State will be submitted to the Commission for an opinion.
These opinions must be submitted within 2 months of the application,
no response will indicate to the Bank that there is no objection to the
project.
Applications submitted by the Management Committee will be ruled on
by the Board of Directors.
The Management Committee decides whether submitted applications
comply with the Statute of the Bank. If in favor of granting the loan or
guarantee, the Management Committee, will submit a draft contract to
the Board of Directors. If the Management Committee is against an
application for loan or guarantee, it will also submit this opinion to the
Board of Directors
The Board of Directors cannot grant the loan or guarantee if the
opinion of the Management Committee is unfavorable, unless it is a
unanimous decision by the Board of Directors.
This policy is the same for The Commission when delivering an
unfavorable opinion, except when the Board of Directors votes on the
loan application, the Director nominated by the Commission must
abstain from the vote.
In the event both The Commission and The Management Committee
deliver unfavorable opinions about the proposed loan or guarantee, the
Board of Directors may not grant the loan or guarantee.

Article 22: The Bank generates the funds necessary for its purposes by
borrowing on the international capital markets. This includes borrowing on
the capital market of any Member State. If the Member State does not have
any legal provisions for this, the Member State and the Bank may reach an
agreement about the individual loan. The Member State has the right to
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refuse to agree to the loan in the event it would cause a disturbance in the
capital market of that Member State.
Article 23: The Bank generates funds to meet its obligations by the
following:
•
•
•

Investing in money markets
Buying and selling securities issued by the Bank or by those who have
borrowed from it
Any financial operation linked to its objectives

The Bank cannot engage in currency arbitrage unless it is required to fulfill its
obligations. The Bank will act in agreement with the bank or authorities of
the concerned Member State.
Article 24: A reserve fund of 10 percent of the subscribed capital will be
progressively amassed. The Board of Directors has the authority to grant
additional reserves if the liabilities of the Bank justify additional reserves.
The fund is developed from the interest received from loans granted by the
Bank. This reserve fund is separate from the income required to meet the
Bank’s obligations. The reserve fund will be invested in manner that allows
quick availability (liquidity).
Article 25: The Bank can transfer its assets into the currency from one
Member State to another Member State to perform its operations. These
transfers should be avoided if the Bank already has cash or liquid assets in
the currency required. The Bank cannot transfer its assets in the currency of
a Member State to that of a third country without the Member State’s
agreement. The Bank is free to dispose of any of its capital, which is paid up
in convertible currency, and any currency borrowed on markets outside the
Community. Members States are required to make currency available to
the debtors of the Bank, so that they may repay interest and commissions on
loans to the Bank.
Article 26: A qualified majority of the Board of Governors may suspend
service to a Member state if that State fails to meet its obligations to the
Bank. These obligations include paying its share of the subscribed capital,
granting special loans or servicing its borrowers. This suspension does not
release the Member State from its obligations to the Bank.
Article 27: The Board of Governors, in the event of liquidation, will appoint
the liquidators and instruct them on carrying out the liquidation. In the
event of liquidation, the Bank operations will cease, except for those
processes, which are necessary to preserve its assets and to settle its
liabilities.
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Article 28: The property of the Bank is exempt from any expropriation.
The Bank will assume the most legal capacities under the law in each of the
Member State, particularly those laws referring to acquiring and disposing of
property.
Article 29: Disputes between the Bank and its creditors, debtors and others
will be decided by the national courts, except where the jurisdiction lies with
the Court of Justice. The Bank will have an address for its service in each
Member State. Any property of the Bank is not liable to attachment or
seizure except by a decision of a court.
Article 30: The Board of Governors acting unanimously can establish a
European Investment Fund of which the Bank would be a founding member.
The Board of Governors would also establish the Statute of The European
Investment Fund, which would define the objectives, structure, membership,
financial resources, auditing of the Fund, as well as the relationship between
the Bank and the Fund.
The Bank would participate in the management of the Fund and contribute to
its subscribed capital. The European Community may also become members
of the Fund and contribute to its subscribed capital. The invitation to become
a member is also open to financial institutions.
The protocol regarding privileges of the European Community would apply to
the Fund and its members. The Fund is not subject to any form of taxation
either when in operation or in the event of liquidation or dissolution.
Any dividends, revenue or capital gains to members of the Fund, other than
the Community and the Bank, will remain subject to applicable legislation.
The Court of Justice will maintain jurisdiction over disputes within the Fund.
This protocol essentially establishes the European Bank and these
principles are relatively unchanged, as is the structure the Bank. Review of
additional European Union documents will illustrate the minor changes that
have been instituted with the Bank.
A decision of the representatives of The Governments of the Member
States on the provisional location of certain institutions and departments of
the Communities was signed in April 1965 and establishes the location of the
EIB. The European Investment Bank will be located in Luxembourg and all
meetings of the Bank will occur there. All activities of the Bank will be
carried out from this location.
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